Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 16, Number 1

2004

Article 3

Combating Harmful Invasive Species Under
the Lacey Act: Removing the Dormant
Commerce Clause Barrier to State and Federal
Cooperation
Laura T. Gorjanc∗

∗

Fordham University School of Law

Copyright c 2004 by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr

COMBATING HARMFUL INVASIVE SPECIES
UNDER THE LACEY ACT: REMOVING THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE BARRIER TO
STATE AND FEDERAL COOPERATION
Laura T. Gorjanc
INTRODUCTION

The introduction of invasive species is a serious threat to American
wildlife. In 2002, Maryland drew international attention after it
launched a crusade to eradicate northern snakeheads, a nonnative
exotic fishspecies, from several ponds in the state.' A local Mary1. Anita Huslin, Snakeheads Slipped a FatalDose; Potent Toxin
Nets Scores of Alien Species, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2002 at B01; See
also Judith Person, Snakehead No. 18 Caught in Potomac; 19-inch
Fish Found at Dogue Creek, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004 at B03
[hereinafter Snakehead No. 18; Lee Bergquist, 'Frankenfish'
Cousin Found in State, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 24, 2003 at
IA [hereinafter Frankenfish]. Besides its aggressive disposition,

other factors render snakeheads a particularly onerous threat to
American wildlife:
Native to Asia and Africa, snakehead fish have no natural
predators in the United States and pose significant threats
to native wildlife communities in this country. The animals are capable of moving short distances on land and
can withstand extreme weather conditions.

Arrest Made for Possession, Sale of Snakehead Fish, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, FEB. 27, 2003 available at 2003 WL 3728408. After the
discovery of more snakeheads in Maryland waters in May of 2004,

the success of Maryland's attempt at eradicating the species is still
uncertain. See Ruinous Fish Out of Lake, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2004
at A19.
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land man dumped two snakeheads into one pond and within two
years over 100 of the extremely voracious fish, which have a seemingly insatiable appetite for other fish, were wreaking havoc in three
area ponds and threatening life in other nearby waterways. 2 Recently, the snakehead a~peared in both a Wisconsin river3 and lakes
in a Philadelphia park. Most worrisome, however, is that by the
summer of 2004, at least eighteen snakeheads were caught along
Maryland's Potomac River or its tributaries, leading some scientists
to believe that the fish is establishing itself in the greaterWashington D.C. area. 5 In response, the federal government recognized the snakehead as a danger to all American wildlife and
out6
lawed its importation or interstate transportation nationwide.
Such purely federal approaches to combating invasive species,
however, have proved unsuccessful. Though state approaches to
combat invasive species have been more successful, they are insufficient to address the problem of invasive species. The solution is7
federal and state cooperation through enforcement of the Lacey Act.

2. Rona Kobell, Snakehead PoisoningMired in Details; Coordination Effort Delays Plan to Eradicate Fish, BALT. SUN, Aug. 12,
2002 at lB.
3. See Frankenfish supra note 1.
4. Ramona Smith, Run! Swim! Frankenfish is Here!, PHIL.
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2004 at 10.
5. David A. Fahrenhold & Joshua Partlow, Snakeheads May be
Making Home in Potomac; Fishermen and Scientists Show Mix of
Alarm, Intrigue Over Transplanted Species, WASH. POST, June 30,
2004 at B0 1; See also Patrik Jonsson, 'Frankenfish' and the Hunt for
Invasive Species; A Thriving Newcomer May Threaten Potomac's
Beloved Bass, Sparking a Search-and-Destroy Mission, CHRIST.
SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 19, 2004 at 3; see also Snakehead No. 18,
supra note 1.
6. See 50 C.F.R. § 16.13 (2003); see also U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Import Restrictionson Live Snakehead Fish, Eggs, Is Effective Friday, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Announces, (October 3,
2002), at http://news.fws.gov/newsreleases/r9/853EiBO9-2BO34BF9-B508CC7A4982DCE5.html.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988).
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Congress enacted the Lacey Act in 1900,8 to "aid enforcement of
state wildlife laws." 9 Congress recognized that the best way to protect American wildlife from invasive species is for the federal government to work side-by-side with the states. 10 A judge-made
Common law doctrine called the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, poses a constant threat to state invasive species laws used to
effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act." Federal and state governments lose an important tool in wildlife protection when courts
strike down these state predicate laws under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. Although the Dormant Commerce Clause plays an important role protecting interstate commerce from protectionist state legislation, this paper argues that courts should scrutinize state invasive
species laws used as State Invasive Species Lacey Act Predicates.
("SISLAPs") differently than they do state laws affecting interstate
commerce because of the crucial role they play in enforcing the
Lacey Act. Part I of this paper explains the history and content of
the Lacey Act. It also discusses the relationship between the Lacey
Act and state law and the Lacey Act's role in the fight against invasive species. Part II explains the history of the Dormant Commerce
Clause and discusses why the Dormant Commerce Clause applies to
SISLAPs and more specifically why courts currently scrutinize SISLAPs as intensely as any other laws. Finally, Part III argues that the
courts should scrutinize SISLAPs more leniently under the Dormant
Commerce Clause by adopting a distinct Dormant Commerce Clause
test for SISLAPs. Under this test, courts should presume that the
SISLAP effectuates the purpose of the Lacey Act, while requiring
that the SISLAP be narrowly tailored. This test better balances the
concerns underlying the Dormant Commerce Clause with the unique
purpose of SISLAPs.

8. Id.; 33 CONG. REc. 4871 (1900) ("This bill gives the Secretary
of Agriculture power to aid in the reintroduction, which . . . will

prove a useful adjunct to the action of the States which have undertaken the preservation of the native wild birds.").
9. MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE
LAW 1-2 (3d ed. 1997).
10. See S. REP. No. 97-123, at 2 (1981).
11. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986) (holding Lacey
Act predicate laws may be subjected to strict scrutiny by courts).
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I. THE LACEY ACT
A. History and Content
In 1900, Iowa Congressman John Lacey proposed legislation to
preserve and restore wildlife resources in the United States. 12 By
proposing what later became the Lacey Act, Congressman Lacey
sought to address the rapid population decline of the passenger pigeon and other bird species in several states 13 and, more importantly
for the purposes of this paper, the dangers that exotic plants and

12. Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America's Premier
Weapon in the Fight Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB.
LAND L. REv. 27, 36-37 (1995). Lacey was not the only person concerned with the health of the nation's wildlife. Indeed, Lacey enjoyed widespread support for his proposed legislation:
"[h]orticulturists, agriculturists, and lovers of birds everywhere, and
also the League of American Sportsmen, and others interested in
game and the protection of game all over the United States have
been strongly enlisted in its support." 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900).
13. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Nation Marks Lacey Act Cenat
2000),
26,
(May
tennial
http://news.fws.gov/newsreleases/R9/A 11 C3D49-AC20- 11D4A179009027B6B5D3.html [hereinafter Lacey Act Centennial].
Congressman Lacey explained how his proposed act would remedy
the problem of endangered species generally:
The wild pigeon, formerly in this country in flocks of
millions, has entirely disappeared from the face of the
earth. Some hopeful enthusiasts have claimed that the
pigeon would again be heard from in South America, but
there seems to be no well-grounded basis for this hope.
In some localities, certain kinds of grouse have almost
entirely disappeared. This bill gives the Secretary of Agriculture power to aid in the reintroduction, which, I
think, will prove a useful adjunct to the action of the
States which have undertaken the preservation of the native wild birds.
33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900).
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animals posed to native fish and wildlife populations.' 4 Congressman Lacey explained the damage invasive species posed to beloved
native birds at the turn of the last century and how his proposed act
could have alleviated the demise of these native species:
[i]f [the Lacey Act] had been in force at the time the mistake was made in the introduction of the English sparrow
we should have been spared from the pestilential existence of that 'rat of the air,' that vermin of the atmosphere. But some gentlemen who thought they knew better than anybody else what the country needed saw fit to
import these little pests, and they have done much toward
15
driving the native wild bird life out of the States.
Thus, Lacey envisioned a law that would protect native wildlife by
curing the problem of the importation of invasive species.
The Lacey Act was not only the "first far-reaching federal wildlife
protection law" 6 but more specifically, marked the first federal attempt to control the introduction of exotic animals. 17 As enacted in
1900, the statute enabled the federal government to help the states
14. John L. Dentler, Noah's Farce: The Regulation and Control of
Exotic Fish and Wildlife, 17 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 191, 210
(1993).
15. 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900). Besides the English Sparrow,
Lacey also identified other species, such as the mongoose, that had
proven detrimental to native wildlife populations elsewhere and
whose importation the Secretary of Agriculture could prevent in his
discretion under the Lacey Act:
[t]he mongoose, a miserable, murderous animal that was
introduced for the purpose of killing snakes in Jamaica..
•[it] has proved a nuisance and a pest worse than the serpent that it kills. It drove the rats in Jamaica to the trees
and the rat now there has become an arboreal animal.
The rat still exists and keeps out of the way of the mongoose. But the birds of the island have been almost destroyed by this imported pest.
Id.
Today, the federal government prohibits the importation of the mongoose along with the flying fox, European rabbit, India dog, raccoon
dog, and brushtail possum. 50 C.F.R. § 16.11 (2003).
16. Lacey Act Centennial, supra note 13.
17. Dentler, supra note 14 at 210.
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control the importation of foreign birds and animals by supplementing state laws to forbid the interstate commerce in such animals and
birds when killed or caught in violation of local laws.' 8 Over one
hundred years after its enactment, the Lacey Act is still the preeminent government weapon against illegal wildlife trafficking. 19 Between 1993 and 1994 over 700 charges of Lacey Act violations were
filed in federal courts. 20 Moreover, in 1999 alone, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service investigated more than 1500 possible
Lacey Act violations.21
To increase the Lacey Act's potency, Congress amended it several
times, most recently in 19812 and 1988.23 Today, the Lacey Act
renders it unlawful for anyone to "import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any law ... of the United
States.,,24 Additionally, the Act also makes it unlawful to "import,
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate...
commerce... any fish or wildlife [or plant] taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any State. 25
Consequently, to violate the Lacey Act, "a person must do something to wildlife that has already been taken or possessed in violation
of [some] law." 26 Specifically, the Lacey Act relies on the violation
of a predicate law, which may be a violation of a federal law, Indian
tribal law, foreign law, or most importantly for the purposes of this
paper, state law.

18. H.R. REP. NO. 56-474, at 2 (1900).
19. Anderson, supra note 12 at 29.
20. Id. at 36.
21. Lacey Act Centennial, supra note 13.
22. See S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (1981).
23. 16 U.S.C. §3372 (1988). The 1988 amendment to the trafficking provision of the Lacey Act is contained in the current statute.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1) (1988).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(2)(a) & (b) (1988).
26. See Samuel R. Justice, Fish and Wildlife, 22 ENV. L. 1213,
1217 (1991); United States v. Carpenter, 933 F.2d 748, 750 (9th Cir.
1991) (citing Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-713
(1988)).
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B. The Lacey Act and State Law

Though the Lacey Act is a federal law, its aim is not to increase
"the Federal role in managing wildlife," but rather to create "a Federal tool to aid the States in enforcing their own laws concerning
wildlife.",27 Thus, the federal government relies on the states to help
effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act - the preservation of wildlife.
In 1900, when Congress passed the original act, many states already had wildlife protection laws. 28 States, however, were unable
to enforce these laws effectively because the rapid transit facilitated
illegal trafficking.2 9 For example, despite the enactment of a Florida
law criminalizing the killing of roseate spoonbills, the mass slaughter of the birds continued because demand for its beautiful pink
feathers remained high.3 ° Moreover, prior to the enactment of the
Lacey Act "all kinds of game [were] shipped concealed in various
methods to other States where they [were] sold in the open market.",3' Congressman Lacey explained the situation before Congress:
27. S. REP. No. 97-123, at 2 (1981).
28. H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900). For instance,
Lacey cites Georgia as having particularly rigid laws regulating the
taking of game birds, and Florida as imposing criminal sanctions on
hunters of birds whose plumes were taken for use in the millinery
industry. 33 CONG. REC. 4871, 4872 (1900).
29. 33 CONG. REC. 4872 (1900).
30. Id. One commentator explained the gravity of the situation:
[a]s early as 1885 and 1886 entire colonies [of inedible
water birds] were wiped out along Florida's Gulf Coast
where rewards to the hunters ran from forty cents for a
graceful mating plume ...

of the Great White Heron up

to two dollars for the pink-hued body and breast of the
Roseate Spoonbill. In some instances, when only a portion of the bird was of value, .

.

. the hunters removed

those parts and left the offal in the field. The record kill
for one man in one season was 141 thousand birds.
THEODORE

WHALEY

CART,

THE

STRUGGLE

FOR

WILDLIFE

PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1870-1900: ATTITUDES AND
EVENTS LEADING TO THE LACEY ACT, 30-31 (1971); Auk, XVII

(January, 1900), 94, 95.
31. H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900).
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[t]rappers go Georgia and catch the quail, net or trap
them in violation of local law, pack them in barrels or
boxes and ship them to other markets in the United
States. It is done secretly. The result is that the market
houses in other States have been utilized as places in
which to dispose of these birds and animals killed in violation of the laws of the State.32
It was difficult enough for states to enforce their own wildlife protection laws within their borders, but once the wildlife was within
the stream of interstate commerce, the states were completely powerless. 33 The Lacey Act presented a solution to this problem.
Congress passed the Lacey Act to extend state wildlife protection
laws into the realm of interstate commerce. 34 At the time of its enactment, states could not directly regulate interstate commerce 35 and
the federal government could not regulate conduct occurring solely
within a state. 36 Congress, in enacting the Lacey act explained it this
way:
32. 33 CONG. REc. 4871 (1900).
33. See H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900) (noting "State
laws can have no extraterritorial force... and the national laws cannot
operate in a single State").
34. See id.
35. See H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900) (noting "State
laws can have no extraterritorial force."); see also, Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 299 (1851). In Cooley, the Court drew distinctions between legislative subject matter that was truly national
versus subject matter that was exclusively entrusted to the states.
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318. According to the Cooley doctrine, the
Commerce Clause precluded a state from regulating a truly national
subject, such as goods in interstate commerce like wildlife. See Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (holding that Congress has the
exclusive power to regulate "transportation and exchange of commodities").
36. See H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900) (noting
"[N]ational laws can not operate in a single State."), see also Cooley,
53 U.S. at 319. Cooley also dictated that the Commerce Clause precluded Congress from regulating truly local matters. Id. Moreover,
at the time of the Lacey Act's passage, it was widely thought that
wildlife belonged collectively to the residents of a state and thus the
regulation of wildlife preservation was believed to be a purely local
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[t]his bill is intended to begin where the State laws leave
off. The State laws can have no extraterritorial force and
the national laws can not operate in a single State. But
interstate commerce is wholly in the control of the Federal Government. Where the States are powerless to protect themselves the National Government has ample
power. This bill goes to the very root of this matter by
forbidding interstate commerce in such animals 37and birds
when killed or caught in violation of local laws.
Thus, simply enacting federal legislation would not solve the problem of wildlife taking and trafficking. Instead, Congress created a
two-tiered system for holding illegal wildlife traffickers accountable. 38 The first tier consists of an underlying or predicate law or
regulation that regulates the taking, possession, transportation, or
sale of wildlife. 39 This predicate law or regulation may be a federal
law, Indian tribal law, foreign law or state law.4 0 SISLAPs generally
regulate the transportation of wildlife by banning the importation of
invasive species. Examples of other state laws that could serve as
Lacey Act predicate laws include: laws that completely ban the taking of certain wildlife; 42 laws that •ban
43 hunting certain species outside
of a designated season for huntinE and laws that prohibit the possession of illegally taken wildlife.

issue and out-of-reach of Congress. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 519, 529 (1896).
37. H.R. 474, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1900).
38. Justice, supra note 26 at 1216-1217.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 84D.02 (2002) (establishing "a statewide program to prevent and curb the spread of harmful exotic species"); TEX PARK & WILD. CODE § 66.015 (2003) (regulates the introduction of nonnative game fish into the public water of Texas).
42. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 183D-62 (2003) (pertaining to
wild birds in Hawaii).
43. See, e.g., 10 VT. STAT. ANN. § 4741 (2001) (establishing a
sixteen day deer hunting season in Vermont).
44. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 41-14-1 (2003) (making it a
criminal offense to possess or control any unlawfully taken bird,
animal, or fish in South Dakota).
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The second tier of the Lacey Act makes it a crime to "import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase" wildlife that was
taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of a predicate
law.4 5 Thus, the Lacey Act does nothing in and of itself. Except for
federal predicate laws, the federal government is reliant on Indian
tribes, foreign countries, and states to determine what species of
wildlife need protecting and what species those jurisdictions need
protection from. The federal government is often reliant on the
states to regulate wildlife because Lacey Act prosecutions often involve predicate state laws. In addition, originally, the only predicate
laws were state laws.46 Congressman Lacey was mostly concerned
with empowering state laws to be more effective at protecting wildlife.4 7 For these reasons, Congress has enlisted the states as partners
in effectuating the purpose of the Lacey Act.
C. A Federal Tool to Enforce State Invasive Species Laws
The federal government may use the Lacey Act to combat the introduction of invasive species in two ways. First, the regulations
implementing the Lacey Act generally prohibit the importation of
live wildlife that is injurious to the United States.48 However, these
federal regulations are notoriously weak. 49 These regulations adopt
a "dirty list" approach - that is, the regulations only prohibit those
species that are designated by the Department of the Interior from
entry into the United States.
This centralized dirty list approach
has proven to be ineffective. The Department of the Interior only
45. 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988).
46. See CART, supra note 30 at 190 (reprinting the original Lacey
Act).
47. See 33 CONG. REc. 4871 (1900).
48. 50 C.F.R. § 16.3 (1992); see also 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1994).
49. See David M. Whalin, The Control of Aquatic Nuisance Nonindigenous Species, 5 ENVTL. LAW. 65, 104 (1998) (recognizing the
federal regulations of invasive species of the Lacey Act to be a "failure" in combating the problem of invasive species); Dentler, supra
note 14 at 212-13 (noting that the shortcomings of these regulations
have been recognized for at least thirty years).
50. Eric Biber, Exploring Regulatory Options for Controlling the
Introduction of Non-Indigenous Species to the United States, 18 VA.
ENV'L L. J. 375, 391 (1999).
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lists species that have proven elsewhere to be harmful to native wildlife.51 Moreover, the federal government must overcome a high burden of proof to justify the designation of a species as sufficiently
injurious. 52 Thus, the regulations prohibit only the absolute
worst
53
offending nonnative species from entering the United States.
The second way in which the Lacey Act combats the problem of
invasive species is by elevating violations of state laws that regulate
the importation of invasive species to federal offenses. 54 States
regulate invasive species by either allowing the importation of species designated on a "clean list '55 or by banning the importation of
species designated on a "dirty list." 56 Whatever the form, the federal
government may use state laws that regulate the
importation of wild57
laws.
predicate
Act
Lacey
as
state
the
life into
Using the Lacey Act to elevate an offense of state invasive species
laws to a federal offense is a more effective way to combat invasive
species than relying merely on the federal regulations under the
Lacey Act. First, the use of the Lacey Act in this way increases the
potency of state laws. This is particularly important because not
only have the federal regulations under the Lacey Act been ineffective in combating invasive species, but other attempts at federal invasive species regulations have also been generally unsuccessful.58
*.

51. Dentler, supra note 14 at 211.
52. Whalin, supra note 49 at 105.
53. See generally id.
54. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988); see also Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a Lacey Act violation where an individual imported bait fish in violation of Maine law).
55. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2271 (1998) (restricting
the importation of live aquatic plants or animals into the state of
California without a permit).
56. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 150A-6.1 - 150A-6.3 (2003)
(restricting importation of listed plants, animals, or microorganisms
into the state of Hawaii).
57. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988).
58. See e.g., The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention
and Control Act of 1990 (NANCPA), 16 U.S.C. § 4711(a) (1997),
and the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 (NISA), 16 U.S.C. §
4711(b)(2)(B)(i) (1997) (regulating the inadvertent importation of
invasive species, mainly the notorious zebra mussel, from the ballast
water of ships traveling on the Great Lakes).
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Such laws, like the Lacey Act federal regulations, are extremely9 limited in scope and thus extremely limited in their effectiveness.Y
Fixing these federal laws would likely not be enough. Because of
the geographic nature of the problem, states are simply in the best
position to effectively regulate invasive species. 60 One commentator
concisely enumerated the reasons why the states are more capable of
effectively regulating invasive species:
a state has firsthand knowledge of what kinds of [invasive species] may be entering its jurisdiction and through
which vectors. [Also], a state can better monitor the myriad of [invasive species] that are in its jurisdiction. Next,
as a general rule, state response is more immediate than
federal response in acute situations. Finally, a state process is often less cumbersome than a federal process, allowing more flexibility and efficiency in approaching
[invasive species] management.6 1
Despite the need for state invasive species law to recognize the
variation in degree and kind of the invasive species problem from
region to region, state regulation of invasive species without the cooperation of the federal government is not without its critics. 62 The
59. See Viki Nadol, Aquatic Invasive Species in the Coastal West:
An Analysis of State Regulation Within a Federal Framework, 29
ENVTL. LAW. 339, 358-59 (1999) (noting that the scope of the mandatory regulations of the Acts are limited to the Great Lakes region
and that the only aquatic invasive species subject to regulation under
the Acts is ballast water).
60. See Biber, supra note 50 at 463-64 (recognizing that local
variations in wildlife populations and ecosystems necessitate different treatment of the problem of invasive species based on geography). See also National Invasive Species Council, National Management Plan: Meeting the Invasive Species Challenge, at
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/council/actionplan.shtml (Jan. 18,
2001) (outlining the National Invasive Species Council's 2001 action plan drafted in accordance with Exec. Order No. 13,112, 3
C.F.R. Exec. Order 13,112 (2000)).
61. Nadol, supra note 59 at 372.
62. See, e.g., Dentler, supra note 14 at 229-30 (1993) (arguing
that a state-only approach is bound to fail because wildlife cannot be
contained in one state and that state-by-state regulation is economically inefficient).
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typical criticism of a state-only approach to combating invasive species is that:
[b]y their very nature, [invasive species] are interjurisdictional and, therefore, pose threats that are national in
scope. In addition, state-by-state regulation can produce
inconsistent results and conflicts and states lack the
power to control the importation and release of [invasive
species] in neighboring states. Further, although federal
regulation may be difficult to initiate, 63
once it is enacted it
application.
and
scope
in
broad
can be
However, these "problems" with a state-law-only approach are
also its assets. It is true that some invasive species are harmful in
every part of the U.S. 64 It is also true that a native species in one
65
part of the U.S. may be a danger to the wildlife in another region.
Moreover, a species not native to the U.S. may pose a particular risk
to one 6region of the country while posing virtually no threat to an6
other.

63. Nadol, supra note 59 at 372.
64. Some species nonnative to the U.S. are so resistant to climate
and geographical variations that they threaten the entire United
States. The snakehead is one such species. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Also, new potential threats to the wildlife of the
United States are genetically engineered animals and plants. For
example, a Texas company recently stated its intention to sell
"GloFish" which are zebra fish with an added red coral gene that
makes them glow in the dark. Andrew Pollack, Gene-Altering Revolution Is About to Reach the Local Pet Store: Glow-in-the-Dark
Fish, N.Y.
TIMEs,
Nov.
22,
2003,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/22/science/22FISH.html?8hpib.
Some environmental groups fear that if these and other genetically
altered pets are released into the wild they could wreak havoc on
native wildlife. Id.
65. Walleye, for example, is a fish that threatens the wildlife in
the Columbia River system in Washington, but are native to the
Great Lakes region of the U.S. Nadol, supra note 59 at 340, n.5.
66. Saltcedar is a nonnative plant particularly fond of the climate
in the southwest United States, where it oozes salt from its leaves
that accumulates in the soil and prevents other plants from growing
near it. The Nature Conservancy, The Invasive Species Initiative
Tamarix
species:
Saltcedar
(Tamarisk)
at
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Nevertheless, the state-only approach is imperfect and the Lacey
Act is at least a partial solution to its problems. When violations of
state invasive species laws are elevated to federal offenses, the state
policy behind the law is elevated to national policy. Elevating violations of state invasive species laws to federal offenses would make it
more likely that someone who is considering importing an animal or
plant is on notice that such importation may be illegal. This is especially true for an out-of-state importer. Moreover, the federal government may pick and choose which state violations it wishes to elevate to federal offenses which would effectively reward states that
pass laws that effectuate federal objectives and thus lead to more
uniform state laws. Although some of the problems associated with
a state-law-only regime for combating invasive species remain, the
best method for combating the importation of invasive species is to
increase Lacey Act prosecutions for the violation of state invasive
species laws.
II. THE DORMANT

COMMERCE CLAUSE

The main barrier to protecting native wildlife from invasive spe67
cies via Lacey Act prosecutions is the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The Dormant Commerce Clause applies to any state law that potentially overly burdens interstate commerce. 68 In other words, courts
will scrutinize any state law that directly or indirectly affects interstate commerce. Because SISLAPs regulate goods-in this case,
wildlife-transported in interstate commerce, SISLAPs potentially
overly burden interstate commerce and are thus subject to Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny.69

(updated
http://tncweeds.ucdavis.edu/worst/tamarix.html#map
region
of
threat
in
any
other
is
not
a
serious
March, 2002). Saltcedar
the United States. Id.
67. Nadol, supra note 59 at 360-61; Whalin, supra note 49 at 10607.
68. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 401 (2d ed.
2002).
69. See generally Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986). For a
discussion of this case see infra Parts II.A-B.
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A. History

The Dormant Commerce Clause does not appear in the Constitution. 70 Rather, it is a judicially created doctrine that serves to protect
what the Supreme Court deemed to be the purpose of the Commerce
Clause--competition
among the states rather than protectionism and
7
isolationism.
The Constitution granted Congress the power to "regulate Commerce . . .among the several states. 72 The Framers included the

"Commerce Clause" because under the Articles of Confederation the
states had unlimited power to regulate commerce and enacted protectionist legislation that isolated internal markets from external
competition. The Supreme Court articulated it this way:
The design and object of [the power to regulate interstate
commerce], as evinced in the history of the Constitution,
was to establish a perfect equality amongst the several
States as to commercial rights, and to prevent unjust and
invidious distinctions, which local jealousies or local and

70. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 11.1 (3d ed.
1999).
71. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979)
("[T]he Commerce Clause . . .reflected a central concern of the

Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional
Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the
States under the Articles of Confederation."). Note, however, that
the Framers did not necessarily express a desire for a free market
economy. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429 (1982).

72. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
73. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond Comm'r of Agric. and
Mkts. of N.Y., 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) ("'[E]ach state would legislate according to its estimate of its own interests, the importance of
its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its
position in a political or commercial view.' This came 'to threaten at
once the peace and safety of the Union."').
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partial interests might be disposed to introduce and maintain.74
Thus, the Framers saw state balkanization as a fundamental flaw in
the Articles of Confederation and sought to remedy the situation by
granting Congress the authority to regulate commerce among the
states.
The Constitution, however, does not state whether this grant of
power to Congress precludes states from regulating interstate commerce or regulating some other subject within their general police
powers that incidentally affects interstate commerce. 76 Conceivably
the set of subjects that Congress may regulate under its Commerce
Clause powers overlaps with the set of subjects that states may regulate under their police powers. 77 When Congress has not regulated a
subject within this overlap, states may regulate in this area as long as
such regulation is consistent with the purpose of the Commerce
Clause 78-that is, insulating internal markets from out-of-state competition.79 Additionally, as long as Congress has the power under
the Commerce Clause, it may expand the power of states to regulate
interstate commerce where the Dormant Commerce Clause would
otherwise preclude the state from legislating. 80

74. Veazie & Young v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 574 (1852).
75. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 535.
76. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 70 § 11.1.
77. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 204 ("[I]f a State in passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be within its control, and with
a view to those subjects, shall adopt a measure of the same character
with one which Congress may adopt, it does not derive its authority
from the particular power which has been granted, but from some
other, which remains with the State, and may be executed by the
same means.").
78. See Hill v. State of Fla. ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 547
(1945) ("The States ... may speak on matters even in the general
domain of commerce so long as Congress is silent.").
79. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 532 ("[A] State may
not promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce.").
80. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,
87-88 (1984).
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The Supreme Court has developed the structure and form of Dor81
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence over almost two centuries.
Today, modem Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence consists of
two tests to determine whether a law unconstitutionally burdens interstate commerce. 82 State laws that are not even-handed, that is
laws that facially discriminate against out-of-state interests, are presumed invalid unless the state can show that there is a nonprotectionist reason for treating in-state residents more favorably
than out-of-state residents and that there are no other less discriminatory means to effectuate this legitimate purpose. 83 In other words,
courts will apply strict scrutiny to state laws that a court determines
facially discriminate against interstate commerce and thus such laws
will likely be invalidated.84
On the other hand, facially neutral laws that regulate "evenhandedly with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce:
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on inter85
state activities.
The Pike test, as this balancing test is called, upholds a state statute
unless the burdens created by the statute on interstate commerce
clearly outweigh the benefits to the state. 86 Thus, if a court determines that the law does not facially discriminate against interstate
commerce that law will likely withstand that court's scrutiny. For
these reasons, the threshold question of whether the state law at issue
is facially discriminatory likely makes the difference whether that
law will be upheld.
81. Gibbons was the first "Dormant Commerce Clause case." 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1.
82. Chambers Med. Technologies of S.C., Inc. v. Bryant, 52 F.3d
1252, 1256 (1995).
83. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336; Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
84. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337.
85. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
86. Id.
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B. Maine v. Taylor-The Dormant Commerce Clause Applied to
SISLAPs
The Supreme Court set the precedent for scrutinizing SISLAPs
under the Dormant Commerce Clause in Maine v. Taylor." This
case established the precedent that SISLAPs should be treated the
same as any other state law for purposes of Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 88 Taylor, a citizen of Maine, was charged with violating the Lacey Act by importing baitfish in violation of a Maine
statute. 89 This statute made it unlawful for any person to import live
baitfish into Maine. 90 Taylor's sole defense was that the Maine statute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause
because it unconstitu91
tionally burdened interstate commerce.
The district court convicted Taylor, finding that the Maine law did
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause despite concluding that
the law facially discriminated against interstate commerce. 92 Without providing a basis for its reasoning, the district court concluded
that the Maine law facially discriminated against interstate commerce. 93 Even though the case involved section 3372(a)(2) of the
Lacey Act, which is enforced by cooperating state and federal governments, the district court declined to lower the level of scrutiny,
reasoning that Congress, by enacting the Lacey Act, did not expressly intend for predicate
laws under it to be insulated from Com94
merce Clause analysis.
The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court that the
Maine statute could withstand dormant Commerce Clause strict scrutiny. 95 The court concluded that, absent Congress's express consent,
87. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
88. See id. at 139.
89. Id. at 132.
90. Id. at 133; See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 12 § 7613
(1981).
91. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 133.
92. United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 394-398 (D. Me.
1984). (concluding that, while the statute discriminated facially discriminated against interstate commerce, it served a legitimate local
interest and that less discriminatory alternatives were not available).
93. Id. at 395.
94. Id. at 394 & n.3, 395.
95. United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757, 761 (1st Cir. 1985).
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it would analyze the law under the Dormant Commerce Clause as if
Congress was never involved.96 The appellate court found that the
statute should be given strict scrutiny because it intentionally burdened interstate commerce. 97 The appellate court reversed the district court's decision because it found that Maine could not overcome strict scrutiny analysis; the state neither proved that the statute
the statute
effectuated a legitimate non-protectionist purpose nor that
98
was narrowly tailored to effectuate its proffered purpose.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court which, relying on
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v Wunnicke, 99 also held
that Lacey Act predicate laws should be treated like any other laws
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 100 In South-Central Timber,
the state of Alaska argued that Congress impliedly approved of its
law requiring timber harvesters to process logs harvested in the state.
101 The justification for Alaska's claim was that a federal law required the same for timber harvested from federal land. ° 2 However,
the Court in South Central Timber rejected this argument, holding
that a parallel federal law does not shield a state law from Dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 10 3 Moreover, the Court concluded that
Congress must be "unmistakably clear" of its intent to insulate par-

96. Id. at 764 (noting that the Supreme Court has stated "that for a
state regulation to be removed from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear" and
concluding that, here, an unmistakably clear design to validate state
laws cannot be found where the overarching principle embodied in
the legislative history is the intent to back up valid state enactments
with federal enforcement power). Id.
97. Id. at 760.
98. Id. at 763.
99. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
100. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986).
101. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 89.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 92 ("The fact that the state policy appears to be consistent with federal policy is an insufficient indicium of congressional
intent. Congress acted only with respect to federal lands; we cannot
infer from that fact that it intended to authorize a similar policy with
respect to state lands.") Id.
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ticular state laws from Dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny; other4
wise, the risk of state protectionism is too high.'0
In Taylor; the Court similarly held that in order for Congress to insulate a state law from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny, Congress must clearly express its intent to do so. ° 5 Maine's example of
language evincing Congressional intent to insulate Lacey predicate
laws was this excerpt from the Senate Report on the 1981 Lacey Act
Amendments:
It is desirable to extend protection to species of wildlife
not now covered by the Lacey Act, and to plants which
are presently not covered at all. States and foreign governments are encouraged to protect a broad variety of
species. Legal
mechanisms should be supportive of those
1 06
governments.
The Court found that this section of legislative history was not
enough to demonstrate an unmistakably clear 10
Congressional
inten7
tion to override the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Moreover, the Taylor Court went one step further. Maine argued
that even if the Court found that Congress did not intend to insulate
Lacey Act predicate laws from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny,
Congress stressed the importance of Lacey Act predicate law in its
legislative history for the 1981 Lacey Act Amendments; therefore,
10 8
the Court should lower the intensity of its scrutiny of SISLAPs.
The Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that either Congress insulates state laws from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny
or the laws will be scrutinized like any other state law. 1°9 Thus, the
Taylor Court concluded that Lacey Act predicate laws will not be
104. Id. at 91 ("A rule requiring a clear expression of approval by
Congress ensures that there is, in fact, such a collective decision and
reduces significantly the risk that underrepresented interests will be
adversely affected by restraints on commerce.") Id. at 92.
105. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 139.
106. Id. at 140 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-123, at 3-4 (1981)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 139. Although Maine conceded before the Court that the
Lacey Act Amendments do not exempt state wildlife legislation
from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, the State insisted, however, that the Amendments should lower the intensity of the scrutiny
that would otherwise be applied. Id
109. Id.
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treated differently than any other state laws for Dormant Commerce
Clause purposes.
With this issue settled, the Taylor Court next determined that the
Maine law facially discriminated against interstate commerce and
should therefore be subjected to strict review." The Court relied on
Hughes v. Oklahoma"' in coming to this conclusion." 2 Hughes was
an appeal of a conviction of a violation of a state wildlife law that
did not involve a Lacey Act prosecution. 13 The Hughes Court concluded that when scrutinizing state wildlife statutes under the Dormant Commerce Clause a court:
[M]ust inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether
the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so,
(3) whether alternative means could promote this local
purpose as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce. 114

The first question was the threshold question. If a court concludes
that the statute does not regulate evenhandedly or that it facially or
effectively discriminates between in-state and out-of-state interests,

110. Id. at 144. But like the district court opinion, the Supreme
Court did not give its reasoning for this conclusion.
111. 441 U.S. 332, 328 (1979).
112. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 144.
113. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 328. It is interesting, however, to note
that an article often cited as an authority on the Lacey Act states that
Hughes did involve a Lacey Act violation. See Anderson, supra
note 12 at 76 ("[I]n Hughes v. Oklahoma, a defendant was convicted
of Lacey Act charges after exporting minnows...."). In fact, the Supreme Court case was an appeal of a state court opinion, Hughes v.
State, 572 P.2d 573 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977), affirming the appellant's conviction for violating an Oklahoma law. See Anderson, supra note 12 at 76 ("[I]n Hughes v. Oklahoma, a defendant was convicted of Lacey Act charges after exporting minnows....").
114. 441 U.S. at 336.
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se
then the court will apply strict
scrutiny represented
by the second
quoted analysis."
the
of
steps
third
and
The law at issue in Hughes unlike the law at issue in Taylor did not
regulate the importation of an invasive species. Instead, it prohibited
the transportation or shipment of minnows fished out of Oklahoma
waters for sale outside of the state. 1 6 The Court determined that
because the law prohibited the exportation of minnows from the state
it "overtly block[ed] the flow of interstate commerce at [the] State's
borders." 7 From this, the Court concluded that the statute facially
discriminated against interstate commerce.1" 8 Presumably, this rea9
soning was adopted by the Court in Taylor. 1
Despite applying the "strictest scrutiny" to the Maine law at issue
in Taylor, the Court found that the law did not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 20 The Court deferred to the fact-finding of the
district court and concluded that the bait fish law effectuated a legitimate, non-protectionist purpose. 12 1 The Court also deferred to
115. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511
U.S. 93, 99 (1994) ("If a restriction on commerce [imposed by a
state law] is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.").
116. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 323.
117. Id. at 336-37 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978)) (alterations in original).
118. Id.
119. The Supreme Court simply says that both lower courts correctly applied Hughes and determined that the Maine law facially
discriminated against interstate commerce. Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131,139 (1986). The Supreme Court is just about as mysterious
as the district court, simply concluding that the Maine statute facially
discriminates against interstate commerce. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at
138 ("The District Court and the Court of Appeals both reasoned
correctly that, since Maine's import ban discriminates on its face
against interstate trade, it should be subject to the strict requirements
of Hughes v. Oklahoma...."). Nevertheless, both courts cite Hughes
for this conclusion. Because the law at issue in Hughes is so similar
to the law at issue in Taylor, it follows that the district court and the
Supreme Court relied on more than the rule in that case by also relying on the Hughes Court's characterization of the Oklahoma statute.
120. Id. at 151-52.
121. Id. at 148. The Court discounted evidence in the form of a
statement submitted by the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries in
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the district court's conclusion that the law interfered with interstate
commerce no more than necessary to carry out that purpose.122 For
these reasons, the Court upheld the SISLAP in Taylor.12C. Taylor's Effect on SISLAPs
The Court held that all Lacey Act predicate laws will be scrutinized as intensely as any other state laws under the Dormant Commerce Clause. In terms of SISLAPs, such as the law at issue in Taylor, the Taylor holding undoubtedly means that almost all state invasive species laws will be subject to the "strictest scrutiny." State
invasive species laws almost invariably impose bans on the importation of listed or unlisted species that the state has determined
threaten native species.124 Absolute bans on the importation of out125
of-state goods facially discriminate against interstate commerce.
opposition to a proposed repeal of the law, that the Court of Appeals
found indicated that the Maine law had a protectionist purpose:
We can't help asking why we should spend our money in
Arkansas when it is far better spent at home? It is very
clear that much more can be done here in Maine to provide our sportsmen with safe, home-grown bait. There is
also the possibility that such an industry could develop a
lucrative export market in neighboring states.
Id. at 149.
122. Id. at 146. The Court cited evidence that sufficient testing of
bait fish for parasites had not been developed. On the other hand,
evidence that such tests were feasible and that Maine allowed the
importation of other fish without inspections was weighed by the
district court but ultimately disregarded. Id.
123. Id. at 152.
124. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
(holding that a New Jersey law banning the importation of waste into
the state facially discriminated against interstate commerce);
Dickerson v. Bailey, 336 F.3d 388, 396 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that
a Texas law banning the importation of out-of-state wine facially
discriminated against interstate commerce); Used Tire Intern. Inc., v.
Diaz-Saldana, 155 F.3d 1, 3 (1998) (holding that a Puerto Rico law
banning the importation of used tires below a certain tread facially
discriminated against interstate commerce).
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However, despite holding that laws prohibiting the importation of
a species are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny, the Court in
Taylor also held that it will uphold a state law that is necessary to
further a "legitimate local purpose.' ' 26 This indicates that the Court
requires two things to uphold a law under the strict Hughes test: (1)
that the law furthers a "legitimate local purpose;" and (2) that the
law restricts interstate commerce only to the degree necessary to
effectuate that purpose. 127 For this first question, it seems the Court
will apply a rational basis test-that is determine whether the state
law is rationally related to a non-protectionist purpose.128 The only
difference between this formulation and the Pike test is that under
the Pike test the amount of permitted interference of interstate com29
merce depends on the importance of the purpose of the law. 1
This characterization of the Taylor holding is further evidenced by
the Court's treatment of the SISLAP at issue in that case. The Taylor Court recognized the importance of protecting a state's native
wildlife from the effects of invasive species. The Court found the
Maine bait fish law furthered a legitimate local purpose even without
definitive scientific proof that allowing out-of-state bait fish into the
state would cause serious harm 13° and with evidence that the law
might indeed be protectionist. 131 Indeed, one commentary describes
the possibility that the Court in Taylor did not rely on the highest
level of scrutiny of the Maine SISLAP:
[u]nder the Court's current formulation, the state must
overcome a formidable burden of proof, given the strong
presumption against facially discriminatory statutes. We
are not sure the Taylor Court's scrutiny was quite this
rigorous in reality. The evidence on behalf of the state
126. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
127. Id.
128. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.3.6 (2d
ed. 2002).
129. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.").
130. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148.
131. Id. at 150.
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shows the statute had a possible
justification, but not that
1 32
it, in fact, was necessary.
Thus, despite claiming to apply the strictest scrutiny to the
SISLAP in Taylor, the Court questioned whether the law was rationally related to combating invasive species and whether the law was
narrowly tailored to carry out that purpose.
III. A REEXAMINATION
A. SISLAPs Require A Different Level of Dormant Commerce
Clause Scrutiny
Under either the Hughes test or the Pike test, courts typically invalidate two classes of state laws under the Dormant Commerce
Clause: (1) laws that states legislatures intended to insulate in-state
markets from out-of-state competition; and (2) laws that state legislatures intended to insulate state residents from the burdens of1 33a
commercial activity to the detriment of residents of other states.
Almost invariably, when courts strike down a state law on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds, the Court has determined that the state's
132. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the
Regulatory State: A Gatt's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1434 (1994).
133. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194
(1994) (invalidating a state milk pricing order because "[i]ts avowed
purpose and its undisputed effect are to enable higher cost Massachusetts dairy farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in
other States"); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware,
450 U.S. 662 (1981) (invalidating an Iowa law barring use of trucks
longer than sixty feet on Iowa's interstate highways because the law
protected in-state drivers from the hazards of heavy truck traffic at
the expense of the safety of drivers in neighboring states); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating a New Jersey
law that banned the importation of out-of-state waste at least partially for the purpose of preserving landfill space within the state to
the detriment of neighboring states); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidating a law requiring a
specific inspection of apples sold within the state because it protected in-state apple growers from out of state competition).
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proffered purpose for the enacting the law was a pretext and that the
real purpose of the
law was to further one of these two illicit protec34
motives.'
tionist
However, SISLAPs are rarely protectionist. The SISLAP in Taylor represents the most likely case for such a law to be protectionist.
Indeed, the facts surrounding the Taylor bait fish law were more
conducive to a finding that the law was protectionist than the facts
surrounding other SISLAPs. Taylor produced some evidence
against Maine that demonstrated that perhaps Maine was protecting
its bait fish market from out-of-state competition. 35 Unlike most of
the species regulated under SISLAPs, many states have substantial
bait fish industries.' 36 For example, many state laws ban the importation of species not native to the United States, such as the Asian
swamp eel 137 or the European green crab. 38 State legislatures, in

134. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 196 (holding that
the real purpose of a pricing order was to insulate in-state milk producers from out-of-state competition); Kassel, 450 U.S. at 677
(holding that the real purpose of an Iowa truck length restriction was
to insulate in-state residents from the hazards of interstate truck traffic to the detriment of the residents of the surrounding states );
Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 629 (holding that at least to some extent, a
purpose behind a New Jersey law that banned the importation of
out-of-state waste was to preserve landfill space within the state to
the detriment of neighboring states); Hunt, 432 U.S. 353-54 (holding
that the real purpose for a North Carolina apple inspection law was
to insulate in-state apple growers from out-of-state competition).
135. See supra note 121.
136. See Thomas G. Meronek et al., The Bait Industry in Illinois,

Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 5 (1997),
at http://aquanic.org/publicat/usdarac/trlncracltb
O5.pdf (discussing the state of the golden shiner industry).
137. See, e.g., TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE § 66.007 (2003). The
Asian swamp eel is a species not native to the U.S. that biologists
have found in Georgia's Chattahoochee River and the Florida Everglades. The Water Resources Research Institute, Another Invasive
Exotic,
at
http://www2.ncsu.edu/ncsu/CILIWRRI/news/ja98digest.html#Anothe
r%20invasive. The Asian swamp eel is particularly noxious because:
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enacting such laws, cannot insulate an in-state market from out-ofstate competition where no such market exists.1 39 Moreover, when a
SISLAP is before a court it is because the federal government prosecuted the violation of state law under the Lacey Act. The federal
government will likely have no interest in prosecuting a violation of
such a law would likely not further
a protectionist state law because
0
Act.14
Lacey
the
of
the purpose

[t]he eels are highly secretive, with most of their activities occurring at night. In the day, the fish hide in thick
aquatic vegetation or in small burrows and crevices along
the water's edge. In many populations, all young are
hatched as females. Then, after spending part of their life
as females, the eels transform into large males. The exotic creature is a highly adaptable predator, able to
breathe air and to live easily in even a few inches of water, especially in warm climates. Although few nonnative fishes invade natural wetlands-instead being primarily found in disturbed habitats such as canals and
drainage ditches-the swamp eel's biology makes it well
suited for all kinds of habitats.
Id.

138. See, e.g. WAC 220-72-076 (2003). The European green crab
has been found along the western coast of the U.S. Aquatic Nuisance Species, at http://www.alaska.net/-aknafws/aquatic.html. The
European green crab is particularly noxious because it "is voracious,
and has been described as an eating machine." Id. Moreover,
"[t]hey have stronger and more maneuverable claws than other
crabs." Id.
139. The European brown crab in particular has virtually no value
as it is not suitable to eat. Id.
140. This is not to say that all prosecutions are pursued with the
purpose of the law in mind. It is certainly conceivable that the federal government might prosecute any violation of state law that involves the taking, possession, transportation, or sale of wildlife in
violation of state law that does not further either the prevention of
over-harvesting or the prevention of introducing an invasive species.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Such a prosecution,
however, is unlikely, not only because most state invasive species
laws are not protectionist, but also because the federal government
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In addition, SISLAPs are more akin to quarantine laws which have
historically been treated more favorably under the Dormant Commerce Clause than other state laws since such laws are generally
Under the quarantine exception, a state quarannon-protectionist.
of
tine law is upheld as long as it is rationally related to the purpose 142
purpose.
that
effectuate
to
tailored
a quarantining and narrowly
This is almost precisely the test used in Taylor.143 The Supreme
Court has held that quarantine laws effectuate an important local
purpose because they serve to prevent exposure to disease, injury, or
destruction to a state's people and wildlife. 144 Certainly, state invahas limited resources and if has to choose between two cases will
likely take the case more in-line with the purpose of the Act.
141. In fact, several other commentators have characterized Taylor
as an example of the Court recognizing bans on the importation of
invasive species as falling under the "quarantine exception" to the
Dormant Commerce Clause. See, e.g. Blair P. Bremberg & David
C. Short, The Quarantine Exception to the Dormant Commerce
Power Doctrine Revisited: The Importance of Proofs in Solid Waste
Management Cases, 21 N.M.L. REV. 63, 78 (1990); Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1270
(1986).
142. Bowman v. Chi. & N. Ry., 125 U.S. 465,491 (1888). ("While
... a State may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life,
liberty, health, or property within its borders; while it may prevent
persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc., from entering the State; while for the purpose
of self-protection it may establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the
State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It
may not, under the cover of exerting its police powers, substantially
prohibit or burden either foreign or state commerce ...." (quoting
Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465) in which the court invalidated a
Missouri law prohibiting driving cattle into that state between March
1 and Nov 1 of each year. The court said the law was more than a
quarantine regulation and not a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the state).
143. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
144. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Wash., 270 U.S. 87, 93
(1926). This case held that:
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sive species laws protect a state's wildlife from disease, injury, or
destruction.
In spite of the similarities, the quarantine exception does not go far
enough to protect SISLAPs. Unlike quarantine laws, SISLAPs effectuate not only an important state purpose, but also an important
national purpose. One of the founding purposes of the Lacey Act
was to protect domestic wildlife from the threat of invasive species. 145 When the federal government uses the Lacey Act to enforce
a state invasive species law, that prosecution is not just for the benefit of the state, but also for the benefit of the nation.' 46 Moreover, to
further this important national purpose, the federal government
needs the states to legislate because national attempts at combating
invasive species have generally failed. 14 7 Thus, without state invasive species laws, there would be no useful predicate laws on which
to combat invasive species with the Lacey Act. Instead of threatening state invasive species laws with Dormant Commerce Clause
challenges, states should be encouraged to enact invasive species
laws to effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act.
B. A Presumptionof Validity

Courts should presume that SISLAPs further a legitimate purpose
unless the party challenging the law produces evidence that the law
is protectionist. For example, the challenging party might present
evidence of a significant in-state production of the banned species,
legislative history expressing some protectionist motive, or evidence
that the effect of the law is to insulate the state from the effects of
invasive species to the detriment of other states. This is significantly
[i]n the absence of any action taken by Congress on the
subject-matter, it is well settled that a state, in the exercise of its police power, may establish quarantines against
human beings, or animals, or plants, the coming in of
which may expose inhabitants, or the stock, or the trees,
plants, or growing crops to disease, injury, or destruction,
even though affecting interstate commerce.
Id.
145. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
146. See 33 CONG. REC. 4871 (1900) (discussing the threat that
several nonnative species pose to the nation as a whole).
147. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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different from the test articulated in Taylor and the quarantine cases
in that the burden is on the challenger rather than the state. Under
the test articulated in those cases, the state has the burden of showing
that the law is rationally related to protecting the state from harmful
imports. Though the state need only meet a rational-basis standard,
the burden is nevertheless on the state. 148 Maintaining the burden on
the state might discourage states from enacting more invasive species laws for fear of defending a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
While protecting laws that effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act
is important, Courts also need to recognize the importance of the
Dormant Commerce Clause. However slight, there is still a risk that
states might use a less stringent Dormant Commerce Clause test for
SISLAPs to insulate protectionist state laws from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. It is true that the challenger would likely
produce evidence of this protectionist purpose, but courts should still
have a mechanism for protecting interstate commerce absent such
evidence. For this reason, courts should continue to require that
SISLAPs be narrowly tailored to further the purpose of the Lacey
Act. This will ensure that states will not abuse the presumption of
validity and that state legislatures will strongly consider the law's
impact on interstate commerce.
CONCLUSION

In sum, courts should recognize the import federal and state role
SISLAPs play in combating invasive species by presuming that they
effectuate the purpose of the Lacey Act. Courts, however, should
also recognize the importance of the free flow of interstate commerce by requiring that state legislatures narrowly tailor such laws to
protect against invasive species while burdening interstate commerce
as little as possible. This will result in courts promoting Congressman Lacey's lofty goals for the conservation of native wildlife by
encouraging states to enact more laws to protect against invasive
species and the federal government to prosecute violations of these
laws under the Lacey Act more frequently.

148. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.

